Co-hyperintensionality, or hyperintensional equivalence, is a relation holding between two or more contents that can be substituted in a hyperintensional context
salva veritate. The author argues that two strategies used to provide criteria for co-hyperintensionality (appeal to some form of impossible worlds, or to structural or procedural equivalence of propositions) fail.
This means that its reference is fixed and it can be substituted for any name or definite description of the same object in any context
salva veritate.
If one or more translations are acceptable,
salva veritate, still the grammatical effects are usually lost.
So, "taller than" creates a context that allows substitution both of co-extensional names and definite descriptions and of logically equivalent components within its scope
salva veritate, in which case "er-than" in (6) does as well.
This is not, as is sometimes thought, merely because predicates and singular terms cannot be intersubstituted
salva veritate (congruitate).
I examine the relation between different kinds of these: while, traditionally, the terms "wisdom" and "the property of being wise" were thought to be co-referential, in certain contexts they do not seem to be interchangeable
salva veritate. Observing this, Friederike Moltmann claims that abstract nouns such as "wisdom" do not refer to properties.
Referentialism entails substitutivity, that is, that coreferring terms are intersubstitutable
salva veritate. Frege's Paradox shows that referentialism is inconsistent given two principles: disquotation says that if S assents to P, then S believes that P, and consistency says that if S believes that P and that not-P, then Sis not fully rational.