This paper develops and argues for a kind of
externalism about certain kinds of nondoxastic attitudes that the author calls policy
externalism.
Tyler Dalton McNabb and Max Andrews, in their "Should Catelyn Have Trusted Brienne?" seem to apply the Toulmin model, citing "a version of
externalism called proper functionalism" (202) without mentioning Toulmin or any other writer, in what may be the purest use of method without attribution; the lack of bibliography for individual chapters here means that someone wishing to pursue these approaches will have to discover them for themselves.
That this
externalism is founded on a continuous interaction between mind and object, material and culture, is in a way analogous to that ungainly coupling, content and form: not least because of the difficulty of identifying interaction, to isolate instances of active formalism, without segregating content and committing what Sheppard fiercely calls "interpretational violence." The autonomy of the artwork (its formal thinking) is predicated, he says, on a heteronomy (its forms must respond to, and be interpreted by, the world), and innovative artists play with the "interface" at which the two meet, hence the book's interest in writing through, in transformation, and its preference for tension and disjunction (points at which that interface could be most pronounced).
Externalism, by contrast, contends that at least sometimes a belief can be rational even if the cognizer is not (or is incapable of being) aware of (at least some of) the rationality-contributors for her belief.
Here the familiar debate over internalism and
externalism raises its head.
Their topics include consciousness and intentionality in his lecture on descriptive psychology, abstraction and similarity: edition and translation of the correspondence between Marty and Cornelius, Marty and Meinong on what judgements are about, his psychological semantics and its posterity: internalism and
externalism, and his heritage from philosophy to linguistics: dissemination and theory testing.
In a 'slow-switching' argument, which was originally put forth by Paul Boghossian, Golob (2015) aims to show that there is no satisfactory account of how one can have privileged knowledge about her or his own thoughts given content
externalism. Though many philosophers have found ways to block the argument, no one has worried to address a major worry that Boghossian had.
(a) A semantic theory such as
externalism, which states that external objects and states of affairs are the semantic contents of phrases and sentences; and
"
Externalism, Internalism, and Knowledge of Content>>, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57, no.
As will be explained later, this is a form of what may be called behavioral strong
externalism.