perceptual experience

The author takes from Burge the distinction between unconceptualized perception of objects (found in animals, infants, and to some extent in adult humans) and our conceptualized, judgmental perceptual experience. Kant concentrated on the latter, but he can be seen to leave room for the former, especially if we make clearer distinctions than he did between sensible impression and sensation, and between synthesis and combination.

In Sunset Light, 1967, tubes of colored light inhabit a Plexiglas column, transforming the Minimalist parallelepiped into a perceptual experience that evokes a sunset.

I will argue that philosophies influence what Husserl and Sartre claimed of the phenomenon of perceptual experience. In addition, there is not much research about how Sartre conceptualizes perceptual experience.

The product was also tested in CSAD's Perceptual Experience Lab, which simulates social and environmental conditions to give Alex an idea of how people will interact with the product.

He adds that these contexts require hunches or "conceptual substitutions for perceptual experience."

And again, the subject is abstracted, intensifying this moment's significance by representing it as a generalized perceptual experience in which characters, and reader as well, take part.

The 'general purpose classification' forms the natural taxonomy of the environment developed through universal (human) perceptual experience and cognitive understanding.

The point is that if the phenomenal character of perception and thought is of the same kind, namely, sensory, then there is no way, on the basis of experience, to distinguish between a perceptual experience and a conscious thought.

To date, however, it remains unknown how the human brain shapes our perceptual experience of being a body somewhere in space, and whether the regions that have been identified in rats are involved in this process.

Mental images are commonly understood as representations in the mind of a perceptual experience when that perceptual experience is not physically present.

The chapter on intentional theories features three different theories, which concern primarily differences in the relationship between representational content and the phenomenology of perceptual experience. Additionally, further variations are noted in the context of discussions of competing views about the nature of content (possible worlds or Russellian or Fregean) and the internal-external and conceptual-nonconceptual content debates.